Beyond the Artworld: Some Procedural Aspects of Heidegger’s Ontology of Art

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Abstract
There is an apparent incompatibility between how art is approached procedurally in analytic philosophy and how it is tackled in (Heidegger’s) hermeneutic philosophy. I claim that we can speak of a procedural conferral of aesthetically relevant status on objects and events in the latter case, given certain conditions. The most important of these is to abandon the view that one or more subjects forming an institution bestow the status of art upon an object, in favor of the possibility that, as ready-to-hand, the object recommends itself as aesthetically relevant to its public. I firstly review George Dickie’s institutional theory of art and Stephen Davies’s additions to it. Then, I conduct a comparative analysis between the conditions set by Davies and Dickie for a procedural conferral of art status and Heidegger’s own account. I conclude that the latter meets the requirements of procedural conferral of status and, finally, I formulate a corresponding statement applicable to everyday (non-art) entities.

1. Premises and Statement of Problem

The argumentation of this paper rests upon the following three premises:

(P1) Aesthetic analysis in everyday aesthetics surpasses the realm of the artworld;¹
(P2) Procedural approaches to art pertain to the artworld;²

(P3) Heidegger is a forerunner of everyday aesthetics.\(^3\)

Given (P2) and (P1), procedural approaches to art would seem to have a questionable place in everyday aesthetics. Furthermore, since the institution of the artworld is at the core of any procedural approach, institutional theories of art do not appear to host everyday aesthetics conveniently. In this paper I progressively argue that because of (P3), procedural approaches do have a contribution to bring to the movement. To do this, I firstly review George Dickie’s institutional theory of art and the additions Stephen Davies brought to it. I afterwards briefly reject Bernt Österman’s attempt to identify the procedure of conferral with functions of objects. Finally, I conduct a comparative analysis between the main requirements for procedural bestowal of art status and how a thing recommends itself as aesthetically relevant in Heidegger’s hermeneutical philosophy. I conclude that the latter not only respects the requirements of procedural bestowal of status on things, but also accommodates more satisfactorily the idea of procedural status conferral outside of the artworld.

2. Procedure within the Artworld

In this section I firstly consider (P2) and review an exemplary procedural theory, i.e., Dickie’s defense of the institutional account of art. I move on to how Stephen Davies formulates several general requirements for any procedural account. Finally, I reject Bernt Österman’s criticism to these requirements.

2.1 Dickie’s Institutional Theory

Retrospectively,\(^4\) George Dickie talks about two versions of his institutional theory, the “earlier” or initial version from his Art and the Aesthetic, and the “later,” improved version,

\(^2\) This premise goes without saying, since any procedural approach studies how non-art objects are conferred art status.
from his *The Art Circle*. He attempted to provide a definition of art before these in his article *Defining Art*,
but the latter has several components Dickie has excluded afterwards. However, as himself makes clear in the end of the paper, the main characteristic to be retained is that *conferral* of art status is mandatory and works similarly to the conferral of knighthood or christening. This characteristic will remain unchanged in the formulation of the first (“the earlier”) institutional definition of a work of art:

A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact (2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld).

According to this first definition, what can be conferred are two things. Visibly enough, candidacy for appreciation (no matter whether bad or good appreciation) can be conferred upon an artifact or upon some aspects of that artifact. Additionally, and less visibly, though, I will show that the very status of “artifact” has to be conferred on behalf of the institution of the artworld in order to make something a work of art. For now, it is enough to see that the artifactuality condition is mandatory and, consequently, will be preserved in the final version of the definition, as well:

A work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public.

I thus believe it is safe to establish artifactuality as a first requirement (R1) for proceduralism. The conspicuousness of a second requirement stems from a similar comparative look at the two versions of the definition and from the acknowledgement of premise (P2). This requirement is (R2) the artworld. The third requirement is debatable. Reading through Dickie’s works beginning with his *Defining Art* and up to *Art and the Aesthetic*, one would (justifiably) take it for granted that conferal of art status is a requirement of the institutional definition of art. However, as can be easily observed in the second enunciation of the theory, such a conferal seems to have suddenly vanished from Dickie’s account.

Dickie’s main reason for the exclusion of conferal is accepting Beardsley’s argument that, if the artworld is to be an informal institution, it shouldn’t use the language of formal institutions, such as “conferal of status” or “acting on behalf of.” Beardsley’s critique leads to a major shift of perspective in Dickie’s account: he will still hold that “work of art” is a

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5 *American Philosophical Quarterly* 6, no. 3 (July 1969): 254.
6 Ibid., 256.
status, however it is not conferred, but achieved as the result of creating an artifact. So, as far as our aim in this paper is concerned, the debate over the third requirement (R3) is now split between conferral and achievement of status. I have several reserves in taking Dickie’s acceptance of achievement of status as it is, and in order to clear this debate I will complement them with Davies’s own remarks in what follows.

Another important change that occurred in the theory is that “artifact” became “artifact of a kind.” This was due to Dickie’s attempt to broaden the meaning of “artifact” so that it may comprise what in aesthetics have been termed “hard cases,” viz., objects that would not traditionally pass as art, e.g., readymades and found art. To sum up his argument, even if an object is not created by man, it can still be made into an artifact by its use as one. For example, a piece of driftwood does not strike us as an artifact, but when used as a digging tool or as a weapon, it is being made an artifact. I mention this change in Dickie’s later theory not because it affects in any way (R1), but because it is crucial for the outcome of the debate over (R3), as I show below.

2.2 Davies’s Additions

Stephen Davies takes issue with Dickie’s view of artifactuality and (indirectly, of course) suggests that this is where a solution for the debate over (R3) lies. Dickie did, indeed, give up on the idea that the act of titling confers status, in favor of the idea that status is rather achieved, but this does not come without serious consequences. One of these consequences is that artifactuality in Dickie’s account pertains to working with an object and not on an object. By using an object as something, people (be them artists) cannot make the object that something. You can use a piece of driftwood as a digging tool, but that does not mean it is a digging tool. Further work is needed on the driftwood if it is to become one.

To explain his position, Davies makes the following distinction between (a)-type and (b)-type artifacts:

- In its primary (a) sense “artifact” means that which is modified by work, by contrast with that which occurs in its natural state. Many aestheticians and a very few

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10 For a very concise summary of his position, see Dickie, Introduction to Aesthetics, 88.
11 At this point, readers may ask why I have only considered these three first requirements. I agree that many more can be drawn from the institutional theory alone, but the main reason I consider only these three here is space limitation. Other requirements would ask for further argumentation, and this would defeat the purpose of testing Heidegger’s account against the requirements. I believe three suffice, and that further research on additional requirements is easily achievable once the framework laid down here is understood.
12 Dickie, The Art Circle, 45 et sq.
dictionaries recognize the following as an alternative (b) meaning: that which has significance for the members of a culture; that which invites interpretation as opposed to mere explication.¹³

He further argues that while Dickie’s quarrel with Weitz¹⁴ regards (a)-type artifacts, which need some (any) work to be done to them in order to become artifacts, (b)-type artifacts do not require that an object be modified in any of its properties in order to gain social significance. Consequently, a (b)-type artifact is as procedural as an artifact can get. Davies fully agrees with (R1), i.e., that artfactuality is a necessary condition of something becoming an artwork, but rejects the idea that (a)-type artfactuality is the necessary type in this regard.¹⁵ Even if many (in fact, most) artworks are also (a)-type artifacts, the latter is not a requirement for a procedural account of art. Rather, what is necessary is that those artworks have (b)-type social significance. A widely used example of an artwork that is not an (a)-type artifact is a story. As long as we don’t mistake the story with its material inscription in a book or the like, it will not have presupposed any altering of the properties of some preexistent thing. At large, thus, any socially significant linguistic construct is a (b)-type artifact.

Furthermore, Dickie’s notion of artfactuality is presented as a lax and ubiquitous activity, whereas institutional procedure requires “an exercise of authority vested in socially defined roles.”¹⁶ The resulting effect is that Dickie cannot tell who exactly confers or achieves art status and when.¹⁷ In Davies’s and my opinion, although Dickie’s later theory states the requirement of (R2) the artworld as an institution, it does not admit that all institutions, be them informal, presuppose institutional limitation of roles. However, if an artist makes an omelet for her breakfast, that does not mean than the omelet is an artwork, because the artist is not acting in her role as artist. So it all rather boils down to a matter of role authority, than to one of skill.

This is to say: Dickie was right to realize that the notion of “artifact” needed a broader sense in his later theory, but he did not manage to achieve it. His use of the term remains encapsulated in an (a)-type sense, even if he admits that artifacts can be “minimal,” i.e., objects that with a bit of work and / or skill gain art status. More fundamental than, and the condition for, an artist achieving art status for his work is the conferral of status to the work

¹⁵ Davies, Definitions of Art, 139.
¹⁶ Ibid., 84.
¹⁷ This is similar to the critique Richard Shusterman brings to Dickie in the first chapter of Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000).
by the institutional authority of roles. Consequently, the third requirement (R3) for a procedural account remains status conferral.

2.3. Rejection of Österman’s Critique

Bernt Österman challenged both Dickie’s institutional account and Davies’s procedural amendments by showing that procedural conferral of status intertwines with functional achievement of status. On the one hand, as I hope to have shown in the previous section, this argument may be considered an extension of Dickie’s later meaning of “artifact.” The basis on which I reject Österman’s critique is that Davies never claims that procedure cannot entail function or vice versa. Rather, Davies’s argument is that procedure, rather than function, is more suitable for accounting for conferral of status, even though the object being conferred that status perfectly performs one or more functions.

Österman holds that for defining art functionally one does not need to take into account the actual fulfillment of a function $F_A$, but only what he calls the “essential function” $F_A$. For example, if one buys a knife and its blade cracks with its first use, one would not say that “this is not a knife,” but rather that “this is a worthless knife.” Since Österman cannot think of examples where this is not the case, he concludes that having a function, and not necessarily also fulfilling it, is a necessary (and maybe sufficient) condition to call something functional. He then explains that this description of functionality not only does not exclude procedural aspects of functional objects, but also enriches those aspects by allowing for the word “artwork” to have a descriptive sense.

My observation is that Davies (or for that matter, Dickie) never said that the two are mutually exclusive, but rather referred to the conditions in which either functionalists or proceduralists hold that they have precedence over the other, expressing his preference for proceduralism. Therefore, I do not see Österman’s paper countering any of Davies’s previous claims. Rather, I see his paper as a successful attempt to argue in favor of something not having to be actually fulfilling a function in order to be called functional, which is, indeed, perfectly reasonable.

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19 Ibid., 68 and 69-70.
20 Davies, Definitions of Art, 220.
Without having proven, neither explicitly nor implicitly, that functionalism is to be preferred to proceduralism, Österman states that procedure comes as some sort of an addition to a work of art’s function, which is its essential being:

Granted that being a work of art essentially is having F – whatever this function may be – one might, furthermore, ask how something comes to have this function. Here the answer obviously has to be given in terms of some appropriate procedure of conferment.  

Creating the impression that the author is actually willing to accept proceduralism, he delivers this subversive definition of a work of art as something having F, that is, an essential function. Then Österman goes on to say that just as the status of art is conferred upon objects, so can a function be conferred. But by this, he misses, I believe, the point of the argument, i.e., that even if functions can be conferred in the same manner as the status of art, that does not make a function equal to the status of art. A proceduralist will never argue that an object (say, an artwork) does not have one or more functions, but rather that those functions are not what makes that object an artwork.

The most intriguing and interesting part of Österman’s account, is however, part III, where he proposes that Dickie’s use of the phrase “the status of candidate for appreciation” in his earlier version of the institutional theory may deem the whole definition functional.

Österman’s idea is based on a confusion between non-art and bad art. He interprets Dickie’s definition, which allows for a lack of appreciation on behalf of the artworld after the candidate has been proposed for appreciation, as saying that that lack of appreciation means considering the proposed candidate a bad work of art. Österman writes: “… the most reasonable interpretation of what we mean here by a ‘mistake’ seems to be that status of art has been conferred upon a bad work of art …” However, no proceduralist would agree to this. Rather, since the candidate will not achieve the status of art in the artworld, it will not be art at all, so there is no point in considering it “bad art.”

Therefore, Österman concludes that “the true nature of Dickie’s definition” is that “works of art are to be viewed as objects having a given function conferred on them within the artworld.” But this rephrasing of Dickie’s definition still does not prove that the latter is not procedural at its core. No matter what the function of art may be, it will still have to be

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22 Dickie speaks of a mistake when putting forth a candidate for appreciation which turns out in the end to not be accepted by the artworld as an artwork.
24 Ibid.
conferred within the artworld. To be sure, Österman’s idea that function and procedure do not take precedence over one another is incorrect.

3. Procedure beyond the Artworld

As stated in (P1), the institutional account has no place in everyday aesthetics. However, I submit that, given (P3), we can convert the above characteristics or requirements (R1), (R2), and (R3) to an account of procedure that can work outside the artworld and thus actually contribute to everyday aesthetics. The principle guiding the following remarks is quite simple and may be regarded as the expanding the meaning and application of the previously-identified requirements according to the following correspondence table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedural Requirements</th>
<th>Corresponding term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(R1) Artifact</td>
<td>(C1) Thing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R2) Artworld</td>
<td>(C2) World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R3) Conferral by artworld</td>
<td>(C3) Conferral by world</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Correspondence between procedural requirements and philosophical hermeneutics (Heidegger)

Note that this is not an equivalence table, but a correspondence (or relational) one.

3.1 Artificiality and Thingly Character

The Heideggerian correspondent I propose for (R1) “artifact” is (C1) “thing.” This is the most important corresponding term of all three, because by itself it is sufficient to explain the nature of the other two (of the world and of its conferral of meaning). Already in its common apprehension, the word “thing” exits the artworld and can refer to virtually everything. But I do not take the term in its ordinary meaning; I am presenting it as a correspondent only according to the role it plays in Heidegger’s hermeneutics. The term has quite an interesting “evolution” throughout Heidegger’s work, where three instances are of primary interest here: a thing as pragma in §15 of *Being and Time*, the “thingly character” of a work of art in the essay “The Origin of the Work of Art,” and, finally, what I take to be the fully developed conception of thing as world-generative in Heidegger’s essay “The Thing.”

For Heidegger no matter if we are talking about art or the everyday, its aesthetics in the traditional sense (attempt to capture phenomena in theory) is some sort an alienation of phenomena from the state in which it truly influences the quality of our lives, which is a
hidden (or ready-to-hand) state. I have already discussed elsewhere\textsuperscript{25} the conditions under which Heidegger may be associated to aesthetics, nonetheless. Right now it is important to note that Heidegger’s use of the Greek word \textit{pragmata} for the things in our daily life is the root of his denunciation of aesthetic theory. He uses \textit{pragmata} as a first designator for the manner in which we come into contact with things in daily life, which is best expressed in the following quote: “[t]he less we just stare at the thing […] the more original our relation to it becomes and the more undisguisedly it is encountered as what it is, as a useful thing.”\textsuperscript{26} Apart from being a root of Heidegger’s disdain towards traditional aesthetics, \textit{Already in Being and Time}, thus, things somewhat map people’s lives. This they do not by being “useful” in the common sense of the term, for “useful” in the quote from above also comprises not being actually used.\textsuperscript{27} Rather, “useful” means for Heidegger the ability of a thing to inspire reliability (\textit{Verlässlichkeit}) even when it is not put to practical use. In a way, therefore, just by the mere fact that it is there (whether we are consciously aware of it or not), a thing is relevant to our life.

But the reliability of a thing is not explicitly tackled by Heidegger until his talk on the origin of art and works of art.\textsuperscript{28} In order to approach the latter thematically, he first of all conducts a destruction of how we normally conceive a thing (as substance and accidents, as sensorial data, or as matter and form) and shows that all such traditional views rather conceal the nature of a thing than reveal it. When a work of art (one of van Gogh’s paintings of used boots) “depicts” an everyday thing, however, it offers an insight that we don’t normally enjoy otherwise – it shows that daily life is supported by what we usually take for granted within it. By observing this in a painting, Heidegger concludes that the painting as a thing has a “thingly character,” which makes it able to relate to the hidden state of other daily things such as the pair of boots. In their turn, the boots have a thingly character of their own, manifest in providing stability and reliability for their owner. In a word, they “gather” the world of their owner.

\textsuperscript{25} Hainie, “The Heideggerian Roots of Everyday Aesthetics” 240 et sq.
\textsuperscript{27} Unfortunately, Heidegger has been interpreted in American philosophy through the prism of pragmatism, which does not do justice to his much more general account of “all that is.” For a firm rejection of “Heidegger’s pragmatism,” see Graham Harman, \textit{Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects} (Chicago & La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2002), 116-27.
The final step toward the everyday gathering of the world performed by things is taken in Heidegger’s essay “The Thing” (1950), where the “gathering” conducted by things such as a jug or a bridge is not intermediated anymore by any works of art. This is where Heidegger also refers to this gathering as “the thinging” of things, or “the worlding” of world, so as to highlight the generative aspect of things. Conclusively, the artworld refers to a present-at-hand conception of “artifact,” i.e., a thing with or upon which work can be carried out. The same requirement can be displaced from the artworld so that it would also consider the everyday by acknowledging that the thing, in its ready-to-hand (or ontological) meaning, predetermines a virtually unlimited number of ways in which it can artifactualized.

3.2 Artworld Conferral and World Conferral

It is important to remark how easily Heidegger’s ontology of art lends itself to surpassing the actual study of art, thus becoming a more encompassing ontology of beings. To find a procedural Heideggerian correspondent to (R2) the artworld, it is only natural that we find a less restrictive term, which seems to be (C2) the world. However, not only is the world a much broader “concept,” but it is also something essentially different from the artworld, in that it requires a non-objective account for being explained. To keep my point short, I refer here only to the desubstantialization that the world “enforces” upon the human Dasein.

The human Dasein in Heidegger’s philosophy is a desubstantialized one. The third section of Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity presents an extensive discussion on the issue at hand. Here, Heidegger claims that a person can never actually think of herself as a subject, since, at any given point, we are always the ongoing result of “our” interpreting the world. For instance, right now the reader is engaged in reading my text and probably thinking about how proceduralism can be applied outside the artworld, in the realm of the everyday. Of course, at any future point, the reader may say “I was a subject paying attention to an object.” But this is already an alienation of the interpretative nature of the reader’s Dasein, since it differs little from saying, for example, that plants come from and along with botany. As plants do not actually need botany in order to exist, neither do human beings need to be

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30 Ibid., 172 et sq.
31 Martin Heidegger, Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1999), 12 et sq.
thought of as subjects opposed to objects in order to “ek-sist,” that is, to have their selves constituted by interpreting the world.

Applying this to aesthetics, commentators were right to say that Heidegger argues for a “relational aesthetics,” in which all our thinking corresponds to what allows itself to be thought (what one would ontically call “external” objects).\(^{32}\) But few have noticed that this ontological fact goes well beyond the artworld and applies to virtually all segments of life. And this also comprises our bodily existence, as Dewey was keen to show when stressing that all our organs, both subcutaneous and cutaneous, are created as a response to the environment.\(^{33}\) Ultimately, then, the human being is a response (or result) of the world as made up of things, and in no case a substantial subject that can happily do without objects. If we understand objects as things in their Heideggerian sense, “subject without object” becomes an oxymoron, hence the irrelevance of the respective dichotomy on an ontological level. And if we follow this line of thought to its full length and implications, it would be appropriate to say that life meaning is actually being conferred upon humans by the everyday environment.\(^{33}\)

Of course, misunderstandings regarding this final point are frequent, and most of them are due to not fully thinking the extent of Heidegger’s ontology of beings. To select only a recent example, in her tackling of art and the everyday in Heidegger’s philosophy, Barbara Bolt makes a bold affirmation, to say the least: “[…] Heidegger was very specific in his use of ‘Dasein.’ He used the term ‘Da-sein’ to characterize human existence: ‘Da’ meaning ‘there’ and ‘Sein’ meaning ‘being’: ‘there-being.’”\(^{34}\) But how, then, could we explain common phrases throughout Heidegger’s works, such as the “being-there” of an everyday table or the “Dasein of the table”?\(^{35}\) According to such interpretations, not only is an ontological basis for everyday aesthetics impossible (since a non-anthropocentric ontology of beings would be impossible), but, also, Heidegger’s use of “being-there” is contradictory and inconsistent. Therefore, I don’t see these interpretations as true to Heidegger’s purpose.

Summing up, in the ontic artworld it is subjects grouped in authoritative roles that confer status to objects, as opposed to an ontological understanding where things confer meaning on life. The artworld is a collection (be it a dynamic one) of present-at-hand roles which second the conferral of art status, while the ontological world is that in which human

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\(^{32}\) Mădălina Diaconu, *Blickumkehr: Mit Martin Heidegger zu einer relationalen Ästhetik* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2000). The following criticism also applies to Diaconu.


roles vanish and things recommend themselves as available for taking on statuses, with no need for human intervention in an initial phase.

4. A Procedural Account of the Everyday

By using the corresponding Heideggerian terms as an extension of the requirements identified in the most prominent procedural theory (i.e., the institutional theory of art), I submit we can provide a procedural account of everyday aesthetics. An account that is still procedural but also goes beyond the borders of the artworld may be expressed as follows:

An everyday object or event is (1) a thing (2) which confers meaning on the world and which may or may not lend itself to being experienced.

Several points of discussion arise upon the enunciation of the above statement. As a final remark, I deal with the two most obvious ones: the use of the term “object,” and the use of the term “experience.” It is fairly clear that the sense in which the above formulation uses “object” is that of “a thing.” This usage is akin to Harman’s clarification\(^{36}\) that “ontic” does not mean “pertaining to objects,” but “pertaining to presence-at-hand.” Hence, we should not reject the term “object” when reflecting upon reality, but rather its implications as *Vorhandenheit*. Moreover, the relevance of the account for the current debates in everyday aesthetics,\(^{37}\) which refer to “everyday objects” unanimously, is more clearly expressed if we retain the term “object.”

The same goes for the term “experience.” It is clear that, as Heidegger rejected a present-at-hand meaning of “object,” so did he in the case of “experience.” The most obvious dismissal of aesthetic experience as present-at-hand is to be found in the first volume of his *Nietzsche*. Here, Heidegger writes that Greeks had the “good fortune” of no “lived experiences”\(^{38}\) as conceived within the realm of aesthetics. The reader may get the wrong impression that, because of his mentioning “the magnificent art of Greece,” (79) Heidegger is being sentimental and nostalgic. Indeed, such is the case with the criticisms brought by Rorty\(^{39}\) and Bernasconi\(^{40}\) to the German philosopher. However, if we bear with Heidegger for

\(^{37}\) See note no. 1.
a few pages (up to the statement of the fourth development in aesthetics), we see that his notion of “aesthetic experience” corresponds to the idea that remarkable works of art are made “for the few” (85) and are based on characteristics such as “height, breadth, and rigor of form.” (84) This is clearly unacceptable in Heidegger’s view on art, where the latter sets up a world and thus influences people’s life in its everyday instances.41 Today’s everyday aesthetics is on a par with Heidegger by its critique of the compartmentalization of aesthetics and the latter’s limitation to the traditionally conceived fine/high arts.42 So aesthetic experience as mediated by ontic norms at Heidegger (pejorative sense) is not the same with aesthetic experience of an object as generative of meaning in everyday aesthetics (positive sense). Furthermore, I have specifically formulated the above account including “may or may not lend itself to being experienced” because, as ready-to-hand, things may perfectly bestow meaning upon our lives without us ever realizing they are there.

I thus hope to have been sufficiently clear in showing that Heidegger’s ontology of art, which is to be understood within a broader context of an ontology of beings, presents a series of procedural aspects. More importantly, those aspects represent an expansion of the procedural account beyond the realm of the artworld, so that it may include non-art entities and thus provide support for an everyday aesthetics.

**Bibliography**


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41 Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 44. It should be noted that setting up a world is not characteristic only to art, but to all things. See “The Thing,” 165 et sq.

42 A very good and concise countering of aesthetic compartmentalization is conducted by Richard Shusterman in the first two chapters of his *Pragmatist Aesthetics*. 